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RESUMEN
La mayorı´a de la historiografı´a que ha tratado las relaciones econo´micas
entre Gran Bretan˜a y el Cono Sur durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX ha
ignorado las relaciones comerciales entre ambos. Ni la inversio´n directa ni la
de portafolio fueron importantes durante este periodo: las principales
ganancias para los brita´nicos provinieron del comercio de bienes (textiles en
particular) y de los ingresos invisibles asociados al mismo: cre´ditos, fletes y
seguros. Los pocos estudios disponibles sobre las relaciones comerciales
entre Gran Bretan˜a y el Cono Sur se refieren en su mayor parte a importa-
ciones brita´nicas de materias primas, mientras que sus exportaciones se han
tomado como dadas. A tal extremo llega este sesgo historiogra´fico, que no
hay estudios especı´ficos sobre las exportaciones textiles a Sudame´rica, au´n
cuando en este periodo los textiles fueron la principal manufactura comer-
cializada a nivel mundial. Consequentemente, al tratar de explicar la evolu-
cio´n y crecimiento de las exportaciones brita´nicas, historiadores econo´micos
han concentrado su atencio´n en desarrollos dentro de Sudame´rica. Sin
embargo, hubo eventos importantes en el Reino Unido, los que no han
recibido atencio´n. Este artı´culo muestra como importantes desarrollos en el
empacado de textiles fueron introducidos exitosamente en el Reino Unido
para proteger los textiles contra dan˜os causados por agua fresca y salada,
promoviendo de este modo las exportaciones brita´nicas.
Palabras clave: Comercio Anglo-Latinoamericano, Chile, Argentina,
Historia Econo´mica, Empacado, Seguros Marinos
1. INTRODUCTION
Very little has been written about the economic history of Chile and the
River Plate provinces during the first half of the 19th century, «probably
the most under-researched period in Latin American history» (Miller 1993,
p. 71). Consequently, the historiography of economic relationships between
Britain and the Southern Cone1 during this period largely ignores trade.
Yet neither direct British nor portfolio investment was important during
c.1810-1859. After the British loans to Buenos Aires and Chile in the 1820s
(which were on a very limited scale, that is, around £1.4 million in real
value), nothing was lent to the Southern Cone governments until the 1860s.
Furthermore, British direct investment in Chile and the River Plate in mining
and in farming was very restricted before 1860 (Rippy 1948, pp. 11, 15-17;
Ferns 1950, p. 204; Mayo 1987, p. 236; Irigoin and Schmit 2003, p. 21).
1 The term Southern Cone means the modern countries of Argentina, Uruguay and Chile.
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In contrast, between 1815 and 1859, Britain’s exports to Chile and the River
Plate amounted to £70 million in aggregated values (Figure 1). As these
valuations are on a free-on-board basis, profits need to be added, as well as
gains from packing, shipping freights, general commissions, insurance and
credit. The value of visible trade and associated invisible earnings is there-
fore well beyond £70 million. During this period, Britain’s exports to Chile
and the River Plate accounted for 3 per cent of Britain’s exports to the world,
the Southern Cone being the second most important destination within Latin
America (second only to Brazil, which took £118 million during the same
period)2.
As displayed in Figure 1, between 1815 and 1859, textiles comprised over
80 per cent of British exports to the Southern Cone. However, there are no
specific considerations of textile exports to any Latin American market after
independence. The neglect these exports have suffered may be the result of
British exports being regarded as a variable diminishing or increasing
according to the situation on the spot. The most widely accepted view is that
early British textile exports after the Napoleonic Wars glutted the markets of
the recently independent republics and that, thereafter, the small, low-
income and scattered rural population of the Southern Cone had little to
offer in exchange. Furthermore, it was put forward that the high internal
transport costs made this former backwater of the Spanish Empire nothing
but a marginal market. According to this view, the economies of the
Southern Cone are regarded as solely «responsible» for the supposedly low
volume of British exports to this region. Post-1850 developments, such as an
increasing European demand for raw materials, the laying of long-distance
railways in the Southern Cone and European migration on a sizeable scale,
were regarded as the reasons for the subsequent growth of Britain’s exports
to Chile and the River Plate3.
Yet, to explain the growth of British exports to the Southern Cone solely in
terms of developments taking place on the spot would be inexcusable Euro-
centricism. At the beginning of the period of our study (c.1810), Britain was
not yet an overwhelming industrial power and Latin American imports from
Lancashire and Yorkshire were still costly. From the 1810s, there were material
technological advances taking place in the British textile industries, which were
translated into dramatic export price falls (see, e.g. Mathias 1983, pp. 271-278;
2 Own calculations from CUST/8, all volumes (1815-1859).
3 Some of the main works in this vein (for the Southern Cone) are: Clapp (1945), Burgin (1946),
Ferns (1950), Platt (1972, 1980), Rector (1976), Greenhill (1977), Miller (1993), Cavieres (1999),
Lynn (1999) and Milne (2000). A Southern Cone’s development fostering British exports, and not
dealt with in depth in the literature, is that Chilean import duties on British textiles fell gradually
from the early 1830s and, in particular, from the 1840s (Llorca-Jan˜a 2009b, pp. 262, 263). The fall in
Buenos Aires’s import duties began only a decade later, in particular after the fall of Rosas (Ibid,
p. 261). That is, overall, British exports to the Southern Cone (before 1859) were also fostered by
these declining import duties, in particular in Chile.
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Halperı´n-Donghi 1987, p. 8). Figure 2 illustrates this phenomenon for
exports of cottons to the Southern Cone, the main staple exported by Britain
to my markets during this period. Furthermore, British exporters benefited
from other important developments such as improvements in shipping
(i.e. in shipbuilding, cartography and communications)4, fall in freight rates5,
gradual introduction of free trade in Britain6 and, finally, the advanced
packing of textiles so as to make bales waterproof. This last positive devel-
opment fostering British exports to the Southern Cone is the main topic of
this paper.
It is difficult to account for economic historians’ lack of attention to the
importance of the packing of textiles in exports to distant regions; there
seems to be not even a single reference in the secondary literature. This is all
the more surprising because packing costs could be an important addition to
export costs (Figure 3) and, above all, because all the extant evidence from
the business correspondence of British exporters and British mercantile
FIGURE 1
UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS TO THE SOUTHERN CONE, 1815-1859: ANNUAL
AVERAGES IN DECLARED VALUE (£M)
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Source: Llorca-Jan˜a (2009a, p. 604).
4 For further details on this, see Llorca-Jan˜a (2009b, pp. 226-233, 241-243).
5 Starting during the late 1810s, freight rates charged to Dallas (one of the first British houses
operating in Buenos Aires) from Great Britain to the River Plate were as high as £6-9 per ton (Reber
1978, p. 29). I could not find information for the 1820s (per ton), while, for the mid-1830s, rates
charged varied from £3 per ton to £4.5 per ton for Liverpool-Valparaiso (HPEL). For the 1840s, rates
do not seem to have varied much as the transactions I found ranged from £3.75 per ton to £4.25 per
ton (HPEL). These data suggest that ocean freight rates for general cargoes from the United
Kingdom to the Southern Cone declined during the 1820s and early 1830s, as Davis (1978) and
Scho¨ller (1951) have suggested more generally.
6 For a discussion on this, see Llorca-Jan˜a (2009b, pp. 244-248).
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houses7 in the Southern Cone indicates that, from the 1810s to the 1830s
(in particular), textiles frequently arrived greatly damaged by saltwater or
freshwater. In turn, this temporary inability of British exporters to ensure
that textiles arrived in sound condition to remote regions constrained the
growth of British exports to the Southern Cone during c.1810-1830s by dis-
couraging British manufacturers from consigning to these markets. This
period in British textile manufacturing was typically characterised by small
and medium businesses (Chapman 1985, pp. 230, 231; Chapman 1992,
p. 181). Competition among textile manufacturers was high and profit
margins thin (Chapman 1996, p. 84). If a given textile cargo arrived seawater
damaged, profits were wiped out and this manufacturer would probably not
consign again to this remote market.
FIGURE 2
UNITED KINGDOM COTTONS EXPORT PRICES TO THE SOUTHERN CONE
(PENCE PER YARD), 1830–1859
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Source: Own elaboration from CUST/8.
7 British mercantile houses that opened branches on the spot after independence were the main
carriers of British textile exports to Latin America. This paper relies mainly on evidence provided by
the business correspondence of some of these houses operating in London, Liverpool, Buenos Aires
and Valparaiso, namely Huth & Co. (with headquarters in London and branches in Liverpool,
Arequipa, Lima, Tacna and Valparaiso), Wylie & Co. (branches at Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos
Aires), Hodgson & Robinson (sole branch at Buenos Aires), Dickson & Co. (headquarters in London
and a branch at Buenos Aires) and Dallas & Co. (sole house at Buenos Aires). Likewise, important
evidence was drawn from the business correspondence of two merchant-manufacturers exporting to
the Southern Cone, namely Owen Owens & Son of Manchester and William Lupton & Co. of Leeds.
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In 1830, for example, Bashall & Co., a textile manufacturer of Manche-
ster, sent a first consignment to Huth, Gruning & Co. of Valparaiso, who
upon receiving the goods wrote home reporting that «the domesticks [sic] of
Messrs. Bashall & Co. is one of the best parcels we have received»8. Unfor-
tunately for all involved, the domestics arrived severely seawater damaged
and Bashall & Co. never consigned again, despite Huth’s requests for further
consignments. This was not an isolated example. In 1825, Green & Hodgson
received a mildewed cargo of nankeens and satteens from a first-time con-
signor, and despite writing to this supplier that «we trust that you will not let
this first failure deter you for shipping again», the manufacturer never con-
signed again9. Even the mighty Fielden Brothers of Manchester suffered:
We much regret that the damaged state in which these goods arrived
should have proved so prejudicial to the sale, but we trust that as both
FIGURE 3
PACKING COSTS AS A SHARE OF THE INVOICE COST. A SUMMARY FOR A
SAMPLE OF 427 TEXTILE SHIPPING OPERATIONS FROM LIVERPOOL TO
BUENOS AIRES, 1817–1845
Year Average Min Max Count
1817 0.7% 0.72% 0.72% 1
1818 0.6% 0.25% 0.78% 3
1819 0.5% 0.38% 0.77% 3
1820 1.0% 0.42% 1.50% 9
1821 0.8% 0.50% 1.50% 4
1824 2.1% 0.28% 2.91% 8
1825 1.3% 0.66% 2.06% 8
1829 1.3% 0.63% 2.17% 12
1830 1.6% 0.77% 2.71% 21
1831 1.9% 0.68% 2.40% 9
1832 1.6% 0.77% 3.10% 15
1833 1.6% 0.96% 2.95% 21
1834 1.6% 0.60% 2.34% 49
1835 1.5% 0.44% 2.76% 43
1836 1.8% 0.73% 2.78% 60
1837 1.8% 0.60% 2.99% 47
1838 2.0% 0.78% 2.82% 20
1839 1.7% 0.75% 2.63% 25
1840 1.6% 0.75% 2.95% 25
1841 2.1% 0.75% 2.93% 19
1842 1.8% 0.63% 2.90% 20
1845 2.9% 2.86% 2.88% 5
Sources: own elaboration from transactions recorded at Green Hodgson & Robinson papers and Owen
Owens & Son papers.
8 Quoted in HPEL, vol. 6. Huth & Co. to Bashall & Co. (Manchester), London December 21, 1830.
9 GHR 5/1/3. Green & Hodgson to Hilton & Jackson (Manchester). Buenos Aires, December 10,
1825.
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from Chile and Peru large shipments of white goods and more
particularly domestics are recommended, you will continue to supply
our friends10.
Despite Huth’s entreaties, the Fieldens never consigned again to Huth’s
establishments in the Pacific.
Thereafter, during the 1830s, important improvements were developed in
textile packing to protect the contents from water damage and, as a con-
sequence, «particular averages» were far less common. For those unfamiliar
with packing and marine insurances, «particular averages», as the term is
used here, happened «when the goods arrive in a damaged statey [and] the
measure of the loss shall be the difference between the value of landing when
sound, and the value as damaged» (Martin 1823, p. 126)11.
As a direct result of better packing and shipping advances12, insurance
premiums for textile exports fell significantly. During the early 1820s, pre-
miums at Lloyds for textile shipments from Liverpool to Valparaiso were
around 5 per cent of the invoice cost value of the cargoes, but in the mid-
1840s the rate gradually decreased to 1.625 per cent13. Yet, until recently, the
literature lacked reference not only to packing improvements but also to this
significant reduction in the costs of marine insurance. This is an additional
and material development taking place in Britain explaining the growth
of exports to the Southern Cone and other markets of the «new world»
(Llorca-Jan˜a 2010, pp. 25-35). It may be the case that packing has been so
overlooked in studies of Anglo-South American trade because it was not a big
issue for exports to continental Europe or to North America, where the lion’s
share of British exports went before the Napoleonic Wars.
2. PACKING OF TEXTILES: PRELIMINARY REMARKS
It has already been established that during the first half of the 19th century,
textiles were the backbone of British exports to the Southern Cone. It has
also been noted that textile exports have received very little attention. Thus,
there is a crucial stage in the market chain, which has been completely
10 HPEL, vol. 8. Huth & Co. to Fielden Brothers (Manchester). London, September 22, 1831.
11 In more general terms, «particular averages» were «all loss occasioned to ship, freight, and
cargo, which is not of so serious a nature as to debar them from reaching their port of destination»
McCulloch (1852, p. 715).
12 For instance, it is believed that in long hauls (e.g. Europe-South America), another cause for
the fall in marine insurance premiums during the 19th century was the introduction of bigger and
more secure vessels (Scho¨ller 1951, p. 530).
13 Own calculations from London New Price Current (1816-1821), London Price Current (1822-
1828), The British and Foreign Price Current (1829-1832), Shipping Gazette (1836-1837), Shipping
Gazette and Commercial Advertiser (1838), Trade List and Mincing Lane Price Current (1839-1843)
and Liverpool Telegraph and Shipping Gazette (1847-1848).
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neglected in the historiography, namely, packing. The impact that improve-
ments in packing had on British textile exports is treated in full in section 3,
but some preliminary remarks are needed.
First, British textiles heading for the Southern Cone were packed by the
manufacturer, usually following specific instructions from the merchant
handling the exports, or packed by a specialised intermediary, or forwarded
to the merchant who would do the packing on behalf of the manufacturer14.
It all depended on who was taking the most risks in the export operation. If
consignee merchants were making advances on consignments, then most
probably they would take care of both insuring and packing, except when the
manufacturer had a good reputation for packing well. If, instead, the goods
were shipped at the exclusive risk of the manufacturer, the merchant had less
interest in their packing.
Second, the mode of packing was not a trivial matter. Figure 3, which
contains a summary of the average cost of packing for a sample of over 400
textile shipments from Liverpool to Buenos Aires, shows that the costs of
packing as a proportion of the invoice cost could be anything between 0.25
and 3.1 per cent. That is, packing could be more expensive than the cost of
freight from Liverpool to Buenos Aires (most usually costing 2-4 per cent, as
seen in Figure 4), and sometimes even more expensive than insurance
charges (most usually costing 1.5-4 per cent; Llorca-Jan˜a 2010, p. 35; see also
Figure 5). In turn, the great diversity in packing costs reflected the will-
ingness of exporters to take or avoid risk. In 1837, for instance, for all export
operations included in our sample, packing costs accounted for between 0.6
and 3 per cent. This is not a result of cost differences for a given packing
material but reflects the differences in the costs of alternative packing
materials.
Packing costing 0.5 per cent was made of ordinary canvas, whereas
packing that was close to 3 per cent was either very good tarpaulin or tin
boxes. Why would one textile exporter decide to spend 0.5 per cent of the
invoice costs of the goods on packing while another shipping would choose
packing costing over six times more for similar fabrics? The cheapest
packing would not offer much protection against seawater damage, but
should the goods arrive in sound condition the savings were substantial
(i.e. around 2.5 per cent). Likewise, expensive packing would ensure most
of the time that textiles were delivered as dry as when they had been packed
in Britain and, therefore, there was probably no need to insure the goods
against seawater damage (thus saving the premium). These were all subjective
14 In the case of Owen Owens & Son, for instance, «some of the firm’s exports were packed in
their own warehousey [while] others went direct from the manufacturer to the forwarding agent
in Liverpool». In particular, most cottons were packed in Owens’s warehouse at Manchester, and
most woollens in Rochdale and Leeds Clapp (1945, p. 25). If the manufacturer requested packing on
his behalf, a commission of between 0.5 and 1.0 per cent was charged by the merchant (HPEL,
vol. 14, Huth & Co. to Stewart & Wilson (Glasgow). London, November 6, 1835).
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decisions to be taken by exporters, and they reflected the level of risk
avoidance or risk tolerance of individuals. For example, in 1839, Huth’s
Liverpool branch reported that cottons sent by Longworthy (of Manchester)
FIGURE 4
SHIPPING FREIGHT RATES AS SHARES OF INVOICE COSTS: A SAMPLE FOR 290
SHIPMENTS OF TEXTILES FROM LIVERPOOL TO THE RIVER PLATE, 1817-1845
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Sources: Own elaboration from transactions recorded at Green Hodgson & Robinson papers, Owen
Owens & Son papers and Hugh Dallas & Co. archive, loose papers.
FIGURE 5
A SAMPLE OF MARINE INSURANCES (AS SHARE OF INVOICE COSTS) EFFECTED
BY HUTH & CO. FOR TEXTILE SHIPMENTS FROM LIVERPOOL TO VALPARAISO,
1830-1851 (125 OPERATIONS)
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Source: Transactions recorded at Huth & Co. papers, English Letters.
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to Valparaiso were «packed with great care in tarpaulin and Mr Longworthy
expects that the insurance will be done at a very low figure or else he would
rather not insure them against particular average», fully trusting tarpaulin to
protect against seawater damages15.
3. THE IMPACT AND EXTENT OF SEAWATER AND FRESHWATER
DAMAGES ON TEXTILES
There are not enough words, charts or tables to stress how serious an
issue seawater damage was for British textile exporters after the Southern
Cone was opened to direct and legal trade with Britain (c.1810). Probably the
best way of illustrating the seriousness of this issue is to provide the reader
with a few illustrative examples. Starting in the River Plate in 1809, one of
the first British merchants to open a house at Buenos Aires reported that his
first textile cargo arrived completely rotted by seawater16, and that most of
the shipments that followed did not do anything better17. Another merchant
reported 10 years later to his main woollen supplier that most of their goods
had arrived seawater-damaged18. Three years later, writing to his main cot-
tons provider, the same merchant reported that most bales «were found to be
very badly damaged by saltwater»19. On another occasion, a London cambric
supplier received the news that a cargo had been sold for $285 per bale but
that «the same goods had they arrived in sound state would have produced
according to certificate $515»20. At the same port in 1835, a Manchester
merchant was «sorry to learn the Hannah Moore has damaged her goods, we
suppose that they must be very materially injured from the most miserable
prices you have let them go by auction»21. Copious evidence for other mer-
chant houses in Buenos Aires shows a similar picture22. No wonder then that
in one of the first meetings of British merchants at Buenos Aires ever
15 HPEL, vol. 26, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (London). Liverpool, May 4, 1839. Likewise,
Ramsbotham & Co. adopted a similar strategy. HPEL, vol. 26, Huth & Co. to Ramsbotham
(Manchester). Liverpool, March 28, 1837.
16 UGD/28/1/1, Wylie to Walliss (Rio de Janeiro). Buenos Aires, September 18, 1809.
17 UGD/28/1/1, Wylie to Walliss (Rio de Janeiro). Buenos Aires, October 31, 1809; UGD/28/1/2,
Wylie to Walliss (Rio de Janeiro). Buenos Aires, January 13, 1810; Wylie to Hancock (Manchester).
Buenos Aires, February 9, 1810.
18 GHR/5/1/1, Hodgson to Rawdon. Buenos Aires, April 9, 1818.
19 GHR/5/1/1, Hodgson to Fielden Brothers (Manchester). Buenos Aires, January 13, 1821.
20 GHR/5/1/3, Green & Hodgson to Bell & Grant (London). Buenos Aires, March 3, 1826.
21 GHR/5/2/7, Owens & Son to Hodgson & Robinson (Buenos Aires). Manchester, November 3,
1835.
22 See, for instance, these two good examples: HDP, Goldie to Dallas (Buenos Aires). Montevideo,
September 27, 1818; Miller & Co. to Dallas (Buenos Aires). Rio de Janeiro, March 5, 1819. See also
GFDP, Hughes to Garrett (London). Buenos Aires, September 25 and December 22, 1841. These are
only representative examples extracted from a long list with further examples, both for Argentina and
Chile, which is available on request.
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reported by The British Packet and Argentine News, one of the four points
treated was the procedure to follow when British merchants were called to
survey seawater-damaged textiles23.
On the other side of the Andes, in Valparaiso, the situation mirrored that
in Buenos Aires: textile cargoes arriving seawater damaged was a habitual
issue. On one occasion, in the mid-1830s, a whole cargo of woollens sent by
Rawson & Saltmarshe, a prominent merchant-manufacturer of Halifax, to
Huth, Gruning & Co. arrived badly damaged by seawater. The original
invoice cost of the cargo was $4,533, but after being sold in public auction
the goods produced only $2,70124. In previous years, there are plenty of other
examples within the business correspondence of these British merchants
(Huth & Co., with headquarters in London)25. Indeed, within the Huth
papers, in nearly every month of correspondence for the period c.1827-1830
(the earliest period for which correspondence linked to Chile is available),
mention is made of cargoes arriving seawater damaged to Chile. Likewise,
for other British mercantile houses in Chile, the Valparaiso judicial papers
contain plenty of disputes about this recurring issue (ANCH-AJV)26.
It may be thought that, if cargoes were insured, exporters would escape
most such losses. To a certain extent, this was the case27. Nonetheless,
merchants and manufacturers were automatically deprived of potentially
handsome profits from the damaged goods had they been landed unda-
maged. Besides, as noted by Huth: «we cannot forget that every [insurance]
claim of £100 causes us a loss of £12, which independent of other con-
siderations, gives us as much interest in providing against their occurrence
[seawater-damage], as the underwriters themselves»28. Losses on account of
marine insurance claims for damaged textiles were due to brokerage fees,
23 The British Packet and Argentine News, July 23, 1836.
24 HPEL, vol. 17, Huth & Co. to Rawson & Saltmarshe (Halifax). London, May 30, 1837.
25 For a few examples, see HPEL, vol. 1, Huth & Co. to Rawson & Saltmarshe (Halifax). London,
October 29, 1827; vol. 7, Huth & Co. to Stansfeld (Leeds). London, February 16, 1831; Huth & Co. to
Saltmarshe (London). London, February 16, 1831; Huth & Co. to Waterhouse (Halifax). London,
May 9, 1831; vol. 8, Huth & Co. to Fielden Brothers (Manchester). London, September 22, 1831;
vol. 10, Huth & Co. to Waterhouse (Halifax). London, November 3, 1832; Huth & Co. to Saltmarshe
(London). London, November 14, 1832; vol. 14, Huth & Co. to Rawson (Halifax). London, August 26,
1835; Huth & Co. to Feilden & Co. (Blackburn). London, December 28, 1835; vol. 17, Huth & Co. to
Rawson & Saltmarshe (Halifax). London, May 30, 1837; vol. 19, Huth & Co. to Castellain, Sons & Co.
(Liverpool). London, March 28, 1838; vol. 21, Huth & Co. to Guest (Manchester). London, October 16,
1838; vol. 40, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, October 18, 1843; among many others.
26 See, for instance, the following cases: ANCH-AJV, vols 291-293, Gibbs Crawley & Co., for
damaged goods received according to Elizabeth Robertson. Valparaiso, 1832; vol. 77-12, French
ship Volley, for general averages. Valparaiso, 1838.
27 In particular, during the early stages of direct legal trade, before underwriters reacted to
frequent claims received on account of «particular averages» caused by seawater. Indeed, in 1809,
after a long run of cargoes delivered damaged by saltwater, a merchant on the spot wrote that
«I believe that some people make a good trade by the underwriters». WLP, vol. 4, Luccock to
Luptons & Luccock (Leeds). Rio de Janeiro, May 19, 1809.
28 HPEL, vol. 27, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, March 7, 1840.
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charges for producing a certificate of damage, a certificate of market value in
a sound state29 and a certificate of exchange rate30. Furthermore, obtaining
compensation from underwriters was always a long31 and tedious process.
Finally, even if the goods arrived damaged, exporters had to pay all the
associated import duties and sales commissions as if the goods had arrived in
a perfect state32.
In addition, although damaged goods were sold at public auctions (a
practice enforced by underwriters), guarantee charges (which supposedly
only applied when selling on credit), as well as storage charges, could not be
avoided by British consignors. As explained by Huth & Co. to one of their
textile suppliers:
You may be sure that the charge for guarantee and storage would not
have been made by our friends if nor risk or expense had been incurred,
but the fact is that although sales at auction are nominally for cash, yet
credits for a fortnight, a month and longer are generally given y As
regards the storage we believe the goods in question have been in the
store for more than a month, so that the charge could not be avoided33.
More importantly, after being sold in public auctions at trifling prices,
the seawater damaged goods depressed the market prices of sound goods.
Seawater-damaged goods were not perfect substitutes for sound goods, but
there was still a significant degree of consumption substitution. Indeed,
Huth’s agent in Valparaiso reported that the Dyson arrived with great:
Quantities of damaged goods, which are now selling off at auction, and
producing the most injurious effects upon our market. Our sales for
29 Merchants were compelled by underwriters to provide evidence showing the difference between
the hypothetical prices had the goods arrived in sound condition and the actual auction sale prices of
damaged goods. WLP, vol. 9, Lupton & Co. to Stansfeld (London). Leeds, March 31, 1814; May 9 and
25, 1814. From the 1800s, merchants in Britain transmitted clear indications to the spot: «in case of
average by saltwater at any time occurring with any of our goods we will thank you to insert in the
merchants survey what would have been the value had they arrived in a sound state as we find this
necessary to the regular and amicable adjustment of such averages with the underwriters». WLP,
vol. 8, Luccock & Co. to McNeile & Co. (Buenos Aires). Rio de Janeiro, August 9, 1812.
30 The necessity for this certificate is explained by a merchant: «another difficulty [in a claim]
would have arisen from the exchange being calculated at par for as the sale was made for the
underwriters they are certainly entitled to whatever that sale produces and if the exchange was
below par they should not expect us to loss the difference. I therefore submit to you on whether in
future it would not be better to state the exchange of the day and calculate accordingly». WLP, vol. 5,
Lupton & Co. to Luccock (Rio de Janeiro). Leeds, March 6, 1810.
31 Very often, it took more than a year to recover monies from underwriters, who always
requested additional evidence to delay payments.
32 See, for instance, GHR/5/1/5, Hodgson & Robinson to Owens & Son (Manchester). Buenos
Aires, November 17, 1834. See also Anguita (1912, p. 94).
33 HPEL, vol. 15, Huth & Co. to Webster & Sons (Morley). London, February 29, 1836.
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home consumption of the same description of goods must naturally
become more confined and our prices keep down by such an overflow
of damaged fabrics34.
Had the reader thought that seawater-damaged textiles had to be thrown
away, then witness this fascinating story. In late 1840, the Captain of the
British fishing brigantine Mary Ann (then stationed in the Malvinas), after
having heard of the wreckage of the Galston, decided to go to the wreck place
and to recover part of the cargo:
Having found the wreck in a totally deserted conditiony he succeeded
in recovering about five thousand pieces of various descriptions of
cottons, woollens, &c., with which he returned to the Falkland Islands,
there disembarked the goods, had them washed in fresh water, dried,
and reloaded, and has brought them to this port, where he desires to sell
the goods for the benefit of all the parts interested35.
Associated with this problem was a further inconvenience: underwriters
enforced the public auction’s sale of all the goods included in the policy, even
if some of them had escaped damage. This point was well explained in a
letter to the editor of The British Packet and Argentine News:36
Another cause which has for a time materially affected our market has
been the very extensive sales by public auction of damaged goods, or
said to be so, for account of the underwriters, whereas about 7/8 of the
contents of the packages have been as sound as the day they were
shipped; this abuse is of long standing here, and always has the most
pernicious influence upon our market, as at these sales the shop-
keepers can supply themselves generally with sound goodsy at lower
rates than what they can be sold at in bond37.
On the other hand, underwriters were reluctant to insure for «particular
averages» on routes where insurance claims for water damage were made
too often. The limits were clear. In the early 1830s, as a result of the
mounting claims for «particular averages» received by marine insurers
during the first stages of legal and direct commercial intercourse between
Britain and the Southern Cone, many British underwriters ceased to accept
policies against «particular averages» if textiles were not packed in tin cases
34 HPEL, vol. 14, Extract of a letter from Valparaiso, quoted in Huth & Co. to Stansfeld (Leeds).
London, December 10, 1835.
35 FO 118/53, Dale to Mandeville (Buenos Aires). Montevideo, May 17, 1841.
36 This was the main British merchants’ newspaper published in Latin America during the first
half of the 19th century.
37 The British Packet and Argentine News, September 17, 1842.
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or good tarpaulin (otherwise offering insurance against «total loss» only). In
this context, effective packing of textiles acquired great importance, parti-
cularly for exporters reluctant to take risks.
Under these circumstances, the availability of waterproof packing was a
relevant factor for those exporting to the Southern Cone. The quality of the
«envelope» for textiles determined whether they would arrive dry, or partially
damaged or completely wet. There were two options: waterproofed or soaked.
As a prominent British exporter regarding cottons supplies explained:
It is difficult for the underwriters to point out the mode in which
Messrs. Howard’s [cotton] goods should be packed, but it is clear that
their present method affords no protection whatever, for almost every
shipment of theirs has been landed in a damaged state; there must be a
great difference in the quality of packing, for the goods of Messrs. Du
Fay & Co. [also cottons] have invariably arrived sound for the last three
years, although they have often been shipped in the same vessels with
Messrs. Howard’s, which shows that the fault must be in the packing38.
Likewise, the same merchants remarked to one of their main woollens
suppliers, who used to pack solely with good tarpaulin, that «the Mary
Walker had arrived at Valparaiso, and we regret to say, delivered her goods in
a very damaged condition, many quite rotten; we hope that your 2 bales will
have escaped, as usual»39.
4. THE MAIN SOURCES OF RISK FOR TEXTILE EXPORTS
To better understand both the recurrence of seawater damage and the
importance of textile packing, we ought to take into consideration how
precarious the transportation and storage of goods in transatlantic trades
was during the first half of the 19th century. Let us start with the physical
path followed by a textile truss from a British manufacturer to the final
consumer in the Southern Cone and identify the main risks of water damage
during its journey. The first risk lay in the packing process itself, which
presented some technical difficulties in reducing moisture40. This was a matter
for serious concern, as reported by a local house to one of its suppliers:
you must be careful not to have the goods packed up in the slightest
manner damp or heated. We say this because, although packed in
38 HPEL, vol. 32, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, November 9, 1841.
39 HPEL, vol. 14, Huth & Co. to Rawson (Halifax). London, August 26, 1835.
40 A merchant-manufacturer exporting to Buenos Aires, in the habit of packing textiles, once
declared: «we have taken every precaution against mildew». Owen Owens & Son papers (OWN)/3/1/1,
Owens & Son to Jackson (Montevideo). Manchester, January 14, 1822.
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tin & consequently impervious to moisture on the voyage, a number of
piecesy turned out slightly mildewed41,
adding that
this mildewing evidently arises from the goods having been packed too
fresh from the calendars, either in a heated or particularly damp state
as neither the paper in which the pieces were wrapped nor the cases
externally exhibited the slightest symptoms for access of moisture42.
The next risk was to be found in the manufacturer’s storehouse. Once the
goods were finished, they were usually stored for some time when not sent
immediately to the Mersey. It would be reasonable to think that early
industrial Britain’s warehouses were good enough to keep rain and moisture
away from trusses. Though this may usually have been true, textiles were
damaged, as a Liverpool merchant exporting to Buenos Aires reported: «five
of the balesy appear to have been placed in a damp warehouse as the hoops
are rusted and the canvas discoloured. The master of the Fame refused to
sign for them unless a letter of indemnity was given to him»43. Similarly, as
late as 1840, complaints were made to a manufacturer producing for the
River Plate market «that nearly the wholey of the bocking [coarse woollen
baize] delivered today have got wet by the rain which fell last night. The
tillots are quite spoiled and they will require to be retillotted»44.
Third, bales from both Lancashire and Yorkshire were sent to Liverpool
by canal, carriage or train. During the period of our study, we can reasonably
assume that this phase was probably the least risky; nonetheless, some
precautions had to be taken. For example, in 1824, an exporter to the
Southern Cone reported to one of his suppliers that «the flannels advisedy
just arrived and have suffered some damage» during transportation within
Britain45. Fourth, once the manufactures had arrived in Liverpool, they
were most usually stored in dock warehouses or left on docksides before
being loaded. In the latter case, the risks were obviously higher, as rain could
easily damage a whole cargo that had been inadequately packed. In one case
in 1839, which is equally relevant to the textile trade, Huth & Co. reported
a sugar cargo being severely damaged by rain at Liverpool while being
loaded46.
41 GHR/5/1/5, Hodgson & Robinson to Faulkner (Manchester). Buenos Aires, June 16, 1834.
42 GHR/5/1/5, Hodgson & Robinson to Walker (Manchester). Buenos Aires, July 16, 1834.
43 OWN/3/2/1/1, Latham Brothers to Owens & Son (Manchester). Liverpool, December 14,
1844.
44 OWN/3/1/4, Owens & Son to D&G. Ashworth (Todmorden). Manchester, June 6, 1840.
45 WLP, vol. 14, Lupton & Co. to Schofield & Co. (Rochdale). Leeds, September 25, 1824.
46 HPEL, vol. 26, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (London). Liverpool, April 1, 1839.
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Until the trusses were nearly on board, it would seem that they did not
require particular packing47. However, when trading with South America,
many perils lay ahead. With the Southern Cone being so far away from
Britain, shippers at Liverpool (by far the most important British port trading
with the Southern Cone) tried to maximise the tonnage taken on board,
paying little attention to stowage48. As Huth & Co. explained to one of their
suppliers after a long run of bad deliveries: «[particular] averages have been
very numerous on the ships from Liverpool to the Pacific within the last few
years, chiefly owing to the careless and injurious mode of storing the
goods»49. Early on, another merchant had a similar opinion about these
shippers: «the Liverpool ships, I am sorry to say, discharge their cargoes in a
very bad statey I conceive the risk by them to be considerable more than by
vessels from London»50.
By overloading vessels, Liverpool shippers generated unbearable pressure
on the wooden hull’s joints, which resulted in leaks and, therefore, in
«particular averages» for textile cargoes. Owing to this behaviour, in the mid-
1830s, for example, there was a nasty turn in the relationships between Huth
& Co. and some Mersey shippers:
some underwriters can prove the damage to be chiefly owing to the
mode of storage adopted at Liverpool by the persons who are in the
habit of chartering the ships in the lumps, and have no other interest
but to screw as many goods into them as they will hold, the necessary
consequence of which is that the seams of the ship give way and admit
the seawater51.
The story ended with Huth & Co. «marking and punishing» bad shippers
«to correct the evil»52. The strategy used is summarised as follows:
It is unfortunately not in our power to exercise much influence with
the ship owners at Liverpool, who alone are the real authors of the evil,
and who alone can effectually correct it y We propose in the first
place that our agents in Liverpool should ship no goods whatever in
such vessels as we may point out to themy In the next place we shall
47 The other source of damage was liquids stored next to textiles. Once, it was reported that
some «bales slightly damaged, apparently from beer having been stowed upon them and leaking
out upon them». GHR/5/1/6, Hodgson & Robinson to Owens & Son (Manchester). Buenos Aires,
8 August 1837. For another example on this, see UGD/28/1/3. Wylie to William & James Dalglish
(Glasgow). Liverpool, anuary 5, 1812.
48 This was due to shippers not being legally accountable for particular averages.
49 HPEL, Huth & Co. to Webster & Sons (Morley). London, February 29, 1836.
50 WLP, vol. 4, Luccock to Luptons & Luccock (Leeds). Rio de Janeiro, May 19, 1809.
51 HPEL, vol. 14, Huth & Co. to Feilden & Co. (Blackburn). London, December 28, 1835.
52 HPEL, vo. 14, Huth & Co. to Stansfeld (Leeds). London, December 10, 1835.
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decline giving such ships any homeward freight whatever, either of
specie, bullion or produce, as far as it may be possible to avoid doing
so without delaying our remittances too much. With strict attention to
these points we think they cannot fail to produce at least some change
for the better y We are quite sure that our refusal to ship money by
the obnoxious vessels will prove of some avail as we are the largest
exporters on the coast53.
Huth & Co. were not alone in their war against unscrupulous shippers.
Gibbs & Sons, one of their main rivals in the West Coast, joined them:
The John Brooks, one of the regular ships in the line to the West Coast,
has again made very heavy average on her outward voyage. This has
been so repeatedly the case, that according to the rules & principles
laid down for that branch of shipping she has forfeited her right, & we
have to request that you will in our name protest against her being
again put on the berth. We have spoken on the subject to Messrs.
Gibbs, who have pioneered to write respecting the same to their
Liverpool friends, & there is not doubt that it is necessary to be very
strict on this respect if we wish to avoid recurrence of the disgraceful
averages on shipments to the Pacific54.
Until the 1840s, British exports to the Southern Cone were transported in
relatively small wooden sailing vessels, sometimes of just 150 tons registered
and seldom more than 300 tons. These precarious vessels had to face not
only the usual hazards of any deep-sea passage, but also two other major
natural perils. These were, on the one hand, the pampero winds in the River
Plate area and, on the other, for those continuing to Chile, the ferocity of
the weather at Cape Horn or in the Strait of Magellan. The pampero, or
«hurricane of La Plata», proved to be devastating for many vessels involved
in the United Kingdom–Southern Cone trades. D’Orbigny, after arriving
at Montevideo in 1826, was impressed by the great number of wrecked
and damaged ships he saw in the River Plate after the port had been hit
by pampero winds (D’Orbigny 1945, p. 44). As an American seaman after
experiencing a terrible pampero noted: «a new and beautiful English bark,
that had left her anchorage for Buenos Ayres the night before, we saw two
days afterwards; but she was nothing but a dismantled hulk, with only the
stump of her mizzenmast left: every spar had been blown away, and one
of her men killed by a falling mast» (Bishop 1869, pp. 32-34). This coincides
with Beaumont’s more poetic narrative: «I can confirm the fact of the elasticity
53 HPEL, vol. 14, Extract of a letter from Valparaiso, quoted in Huth & Co. to Stansfeld (Leeds).
London, December 10, 1835.
54 HPEL, vol. 19, Huth & Co. to Castellain, Sons & Co. (Liverpool). London, March 28, 1838.
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of the pamperos; their vigour is proverbial, blowing down houses, and
destroying the shipping in the river — nay, it may seem blowing away the
mighty river itself» (Beaumont 1828, p. 47).
If the pampero was respected, nothing caused more fear among sailors
than Cape Horn, «a maritime graveyard for centuries» (Rydell 1952, p. 1). In
the words of one of the most eminent British maritime historians: «no ship
ever approached the latitude of the Horn without carefully preparing for the
extreme limit to which bad weather could go» (Lubbock 1927, p. 94). Indeed,
a local British merchants’ newspaper claimed — with some exaggeration —
that «being situated in the West of the American continent, beyond the
tempestuous ocean which lashes Cape Horn, Chili has been neglected, with
regard to commerce been always unknown»55. No doubt, then, vessels
engaged in these trades were greatly exposed to seawater and rain floods,
liable to unexpected and improvised repairs and, ultimately, to wreck. It can
be safely stated that during the first decades of commercial intercourse
between Britain and the republics, most textile bales arrived at the ports of
Chile and the River Plate after being in permanent contact with water.
Ordinary canvas — extensively used to pack bales by British textile exporters
to nearby markets — provided no protection whatsoever to the staples
exported by Britain to the region.
Furthermore, the arrival of vessels did not mean that perils had now
passed: bales were still exposed to the dangers of unloading. This was
done by hand, using insecure lighters and carts56, which greatly exposed
packages to more contact with seawater and river water, not to mention
the perils of the rainy season57. As an eminent Chilean historian observed,
Valparaiso’s labourers unloaded vessels with the seawater covering half
their bodies and sometimes even their shoulders, carrying bales of over
two quintals each (Encina 1945-1952, p. 185). After being unloaded,
goods were kept in improvised stores, which further exposed bales to rain
damage58. Finally, textiles were redistributed from Buenos Aires or
Valparaiso to the interior, not in coaches, boats or trains as in Britain
or in continental Europe, but mostly on mule back, which entailed an
additional risk of water damage. After exposure to all these risks, it is
not surprising then that before the 1830s seawater damage was such a
recurring issue.
55 The British Packet and Argentine News, January 12, 1833.
56 For an example of goods damaged by freshwater when lightering cargoes, see GHR/5/1/3,
Green & Hodgson to Fielden Brothers (London). Buenos Aires, June 22, 1829.
57 For examples of goods damaged during the rainy season, see GHR/5/1/5, Hodgson &
Robinson to Walker (Manchester). Buenos Aires, May 15 and 21, 1834.
58 See, for instance, the case of some cottons imported by Richard Price being damaged by
rainwater while stored in a custom warehouse at Valparaiso. ANCH-AJS, vol. 780-14, Richard Price
against the Treasury for averages. Santiago de Chile, August 1830.
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5. IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PACKING OF TEXTILES AND ITS
POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES
The preceding paragraphs have shown that, when exporting to remote
and less-developed outlets, packing was very important. The question, then,
is what sort of packing was required to keep out both fresh and saltwater?59
As mentioned above, the ordinary packing most usually used for exports to
continental Europe was not enough. As a Mancunian merchant exporting to
Buenos Aires put it to one of his Halifax suppliers:
we have delayed the remittances for the last four bales having on
opening one bale found it insecurely packed and not agreeable to our
orders. There is no oilcloth round the trusses, nothing but a single
canvas. This you must know from your own experience is quite
insufficient to secure the goods from [seawater] damage60.
Textiles heading for the Southern Cone had to be packed with more
expensive materials, such as oilcloth61, tarpaulin62 or soldered tin cases.
During the 1810s, 1820s and 1830s, oilcloth was extensively used and,
though providing more protection than single canvas, it was not always good
enough to keep water and moisture away from textile trusses. Furthermore,
oilcloth used for exports to the Southern Cone needed so much oil that often
oil soaked through into the packages and damaged the textiles63; the cure
could be worse than the illness. In addition, as time passed, oilcloth was
«looked upon as affording little or no protection»64. The main reason put
forward by underwriters was that «the slightest friction removed the oil at
once»65. In the early 1840s, for instance, Huth & Co. were convinced that
oilcloth was a material that was by no means «calculated to keep out the
seawater» in the trades to Chile66. Indeed, by 1844, there was, among
59 Besides packing in tarpaulin, another strategy used by exporters to prevent seawater damage
was to stow bales in strategic places. As a textile merchant put it: «we shall make a point of seeing
the bales stowed in such a position in the vessels’ hold as to prevent as far as possible the risk of sea-
damage». OWN/3/2/1/14, Latham Brothers to Owens & Son (Manchester). Liverpool, Apri 7, 1845.
See also GHR/5/1/5, Hodgson & Robinson to Owens & Sons (Manchester). Buenos Aires, June 10,
1835: «here we may suggest that as you make it a rule not to insure against sea damage, in winter
time when vessels have to encounter such rough straining weather, please have your packages
stowed in the centre of the cargo»; GHR/5/1/6, Hodgson & Robinson to Owens & Son (Manchester).
Buenos Aires, April 16, 1836.
60 OWN/3/1/2, Owens & Son to Hartley (Halifax). Manchester, August 19, 1834.
61 Oilcloth was a material made from canvas with a layer of oil to protect against water damage.
62 Tarpaulin was a material made from canvas impregnated with tar so as to make it water-
proof.
63 GHRP/5/1/7, Hodgson & Robinson to Faulkner (Manchester). Buenos Aires, July 9, 1838.
64 HPEL, vol. 40, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, December 18, 1843.
65 HPEL, vol. 34, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, April 11, 1842.
66 HPEL, vol. 39, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, September 16, 1843.
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underwriters, a decided «objection to oil cloth packing»67 for shipments to
the Pacific to such an extent that those who were able to insure against
«particular averages» their goods packed in oilcloth should consider them-
selves «fortunate in having been enabled to effect the insurance at all»68.
Instead, a good tarpaulin was as waterproof as any of today’s plastic
materials69, and it started to be increasingly used by British exporters to
the Southern Cone. For instance, from the early 1830s, Huth & Co.’s head-
quarters started to give clear indications to their textile suppliers that the
whole of the bales consigned to them had «to be carefully packed in tar-
paulin»70, and nothing but tarpaulin (excepting tin cases). As a newcomer in
the trade was informed: «we are happy to observey that our goods are ready
for packing and now beg you will fit them up in long square packages covered
with tarpaulin»71.
As to the high reputation enjoyed by tarpaulin, a local merchant wrote to
his headquarters:
if the goods are properly and honestly packed as we have suggested it
is impossible they can become damaged, which it is evident from the
baizes of Mr. Rawson which always come in the most perfect order.
We have had in some instances bales of his goods which to all outward
appearances were completely rotten but when the tarpaulins & linens
and brown paper were removed the baizes appeared as fresh and
dry as when they were first packed. We remember also that when
the Collins & Mariana was wrecked few leagues south of us all the
baizes which were washed on shore in entire packages were entirely
uninjured72.
This being the case, tarpaulin really was a remarkable British innovation.
Indeed, in the dispute between Huth & Co. and some Liverpool shippers,
previously described, the head of this house had the idea that, rather than
marking and punishing shippers, «a much better plan y would be to
recommend our friends to pack their goods in tarpaulins» only73.
Tarpaulin was so highly regarded that underwriters refused to pay com-
pensation for seawater damage if the merchant had declared the bales to be
67 HPEL, vol. 42, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, January 5, 1844.
68 Ibid.
69 In the early 1830s, Britain was already producing such a good, resistant and strong tarpaulin
that it was used to cover cargoes in the Liverpool-Manchester railway to protect them against sparks
and chunks of burning coke thrown off by the locomotives (Donaghy 1972, p. 106).
70 HPEL, vol. 7, Huth & Co. to Schwann (Huddersfield). London, March 3 and 8, 1831.
71 HPEL, vol. 7, Huth & Co. to Schwann (Huddersfield). London, April 22, 1831. See also
vol. 11, Huth & Co. to Webster & Sons (Morley). London, February 23, 1833.
72 HPEL, vol. 14, Extract of a letter from Valparaiso, quoted in Huth & Co. to Stansfeld (Leeds).
London, December 10, 1835.
73 HPEL, vol. 14, Huth & Co. to Stansfeld (Leeds). London, December 10, 1835.
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wrapped in tarpaulin. For many underwriters, a good tarpaulin should be
nearly 100 per cent waterproof, an opinion shared by Huth’s head office:
We were not aware that the Daniel Grant had been nearly full of
water y had this however been the case, we still think that goods
packed in real tarpaulin might have escaped if not without damage
certainly with much less deterioration than the now in question, as a
proof we could mention that Messrs. Jacomb’s goods shipped at the
same time and insured in the same policy with Messrs. Garnett &
Hornfall have escaped altogether, and we have known and instance of
Mr. W. H. Rawson’s goods were virtually under water some days and
yet arrived in a sound condition74.
While tarpaulin enjoyed a high reputation, soldered tin boxes were
regarded as superior protection, though certainly much more expensive.
Owing to their higher costs, tin cases were largely confined to luxury textiles,
such as silks, for which packing costs represented a less important propor-
tion within total export costs and which, in turn, could not bear a long
oceanic passage if exposed to any moisture75. Indeed, a local British mer-
chant was of the opinion that silk goods «could not stand the voyage from
Europe [to Chile] unless in a tin case properly closed without arriving here
full of stains and spots caused by damp»76.
Last but not least, as I suggested at the beginning of this paper, there was
a crucial link between packing and marine insurance that ought to be
addressed. As a London merchant remarked: «we have effected the insur-
ances you ordery but cannot fix the premium until you state how the goods
are packed»77. The better the packing, the lower the premiums for «parti-
cular averages»78, though the crucial point was whether lower premiums
compensated for the higher costs of packing. Insurance rates, as a share of
the invoice value of the cargoes, could be as much as 4–5 per cent, if packed
in ordinary canvas, or as little as 1.5 per cent, if packed in tin cases. In turn,
the cheapest of all packages could cost 0.5–1 per cent of the invoice value
of the cargoes, while the most expensive packing never cost more than
3 per cent (Figure 3)79. Adding these extreme rates together, the combined
74 HPEL, vol. 40, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, December 18, 1843.
75 GHR/5/1/1, Hodgson to Green (London). Buenos Aires, November 4, 1820; GHR/5/1/5,
Hodgson & Robinson to Faulkner (Manchester). Buenos Aires, September 9, 1835.
76 ANCH-AJV, vol. 566-6, Yetts against Smith. Valparaiso, November 19, 1840.
77 HPEL, vol. 35, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, August 27, 1842.
78 In most cases, textiles packed in soldered tin cases did not need to be insured against
«particular averages». As Hodgson instructed, if packing in tin cases, «you will please only insure
against total loss, thus packed there is not risk of the goods running out sea damaged». GHR/5/1/6,
Hodgson & Robinson to Faulkner (Manchester). Buenos Aires, December 13, 1837.
79 Tarpaulin cost around three times more than ordinary canvas. OWN/2/1/2, Packing Book,
1837-1843.
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costs of cheap packing and expensive insurance were similar to those of
expensive packing and cheap insurance, though, in the former case, there
was a greater risk of being deprived of profits as there was a higher likelihood
of textiles arriving damaged. It was certainly a matter of individual choice.
Indeed, some exporters opted for cheap packing and no insurance at all,
while Huth & Co. always professed «the necessity of using the best possible
packing, the additional cost of which will be saved in the premium»80. No
wonder a Baring Brothers’ agent portrayed the head of this house, Frederick
Huth, as «a more prudent circumspect man»81.
6. OTHER DIMENSIONS OF TEXTILE PACKING
Besides water protection, the packing of textiles had other functions that
make it a variable worth examining. Good packing also ensured that, once
the merchandise arrived at its destination, it could be quickly unloaded from
British ships and re-loaded on local means of transport for redistribution.
This was a matter of great concern for textile exporters, who transmitted
clear indications to their agents in this respect. Indeed, in the first memor-
andum sent by Gibbs & Son of London to his branch house in Valparaiso, it
was remarked that one of the first objects of the branch was to forward home
the best «directions for the proper mode of packing»82.
Because in Chile and Argentina there were no good roads, canals or
railways before the 1860s, textile trusses were specially designed to be put in
horse/ox carts and above all on mule back. One London merchant requested
that textile bales should have a weight of no more than 150 lbs, adding that
«this point is important as the packages are to form loads for mules and the
goods must be carefully packed and wrapped y so as not to suffer injury
from such a mode of carriage»83. As in many other aspects, exporters learnt
as they went along:
Mr. Zalayeta is quite in despair at this mistake, as the balesy are too
heavy for that part of the country where they are intended for, and he
would therefore find himself under the necessity of having them
opened and repacked, in the place of landing, which would be a very
costly operation there, and would be attended with great trouble and
inconvenience, if not altogether impossible in some places. We feel
80 HPEL, vol. 40, Huth & Co. to Huth & Co. (Liverpool). London, November 23, 1843.
81 HC 16/1, undated, c.1830s.
82 AGSP, MS 19883, Principal objects of the Valparaiso house. London, April 1, 1825.
83 HPEL, vol. 43, Huth & Co. to Webster & Sons (Morley). London, July 11, 1844. See also
GHR/5/1/1, Hodgson to Sykes (Leeds). Buenos Aires, February 16, 1819. Hodgson recommended
making up packages «in four small inner bales of three pieces each (for the conveyance of mule
carriage)».
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therefore under the absolute necessity of requesting your Halifax
friends to have them repacked84.
Small trusses85 were preferred to facilitate loading mules, as well as to
promote sales on board (i.e. before import duties were paid)86. Furthermore,
the «army» of small native merchants buying from the British local houses
could only take textiles in small amounts. In Hodgson’s opinion: «smaller
packages are certainly more saleable»87 as «the smaller dealers and traders in
general cannot take more than 600 to 1000 yards» each88. Moreover, packing
was also seen as an instrument to prevent robberies:
You are aware of the frequent robberies which take place in the
launches in landing the goods herey It will be well therefore for you
to suggest to shippers some mode of packing their goods which
externally will immediately show whether or not the packages have
been open on its way89.
Last but not least, packing also served the purpose of cheating the customs
authorities to reduce the payment of high import duties:
I before desire you to mark the two shortest pieces in the bale correctly.
Pray have this done always, & what is more important pray desire the
balers always to put the shortest pieces with their faces to the mark of
the bale, [so] that they may be seen & they only see you y This is of
consequence as (without opening both sides of the bales) the Custom
House Officer usually averages the length of the whole bale by the mean
of those pieces which he sees, viz. those with the faces to the mark90.
Adding that
[These] two centre pieces in each trussy being of same width as the
others & externally the same in every respect, might be of much more
84 HPEL, vol. 8, Huth & Co. to Saltmarshe (London). London, July 19, 1831. See also AGSP, MS
11469-3, Bo¨hl to Brown (Santiago de Chile). Valparaiso, September 22, 1859.
85 The smaller the trusses, the more expensive the packing. Yet the benefits of packing in small
trusses more than compensated for the extra costs of packing. GHR/5/2/6, Owens & Son to Hodgson
& Robinson (Buenos Aires). Manchester, September 24, 1834.
86 HPEL, vol. 11, Huth & Co. to Pennington (Hindley). London, February 28, 1833.
87 GHR/5/1/2, Green & Hodgson to Fielden Brothers (Manchester). Buenos Aires, June 12,
1823. See also GHR/5/1/1, Hodgson to Gould (Rochdale). Buenos Aires, July 15, 1818.
88 GHR/5/1/5, Hodgson & Robinson to Owens & Son (Manchester). Buenos Aires, November
17, 1834.
89 GHR/5/1/1, Hodgson to Sykes (Leeds). Buenos Aires, 6 November 1818. For other examples
of robberies, see UGD/28/1/2. Wylie to Wallis (Rio). Buenos Aires, January 13, 1810.
90 GHR/5/1/1, Hodgson to Rawdon. Buenos Aires, October 24, 1818.
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inferior quality. On despatching clothes you will observe they do not
open the bales out entirely, & always open on the top or face of the
bale, where the mark is placed91.
This was no isolated example. In neighbouring Brazil, another merchant
advised his partners at Leeds:
It is possible perhaps to fold 3 stockings together instead of 2 so as to
be counted for single pairs. By this mean if fortunate we may save
50 per cent in the duties, besides some other expensesy In hardware
also 15 are put in parcels instead of 12 for the dozen92.
For this purpose, the packing in bales (ideally with tarpaulin) was regarded
as superior to the packing in tin cases because the case contents could be
inspected without difficulty by local Custom officers, and therefore it was
«easier to pass fine goods at a low rate by being packed in bales than in [tin]
cases»93.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The preceding sections have shown that after the collapse of the Spanish
American Empire, British textile exports to the recently created republics
during the 1810s, 1820s and 1830s often arrived in a very damaged state. This
important topic has been neglected in Anglo-Latin American trade studies.
During this early period, most textile bales were packed in ordinary canvas or
at most in oilcloth. The main cause of damage for textiles thus packed — the
main staple exported by Britain to the Southern Cone during the first half of
the 19th century — was seawater and freshwater. Water-damaged textiles
were sold at public auctions at very reduced prices, which also depressed sale
prices of sound goods. If textile bales had not been insured, the costs asso-
ciated with water damage were substantial. At best, had the textiles been
insured, losses were less considerable, but in any case British textile expor-
ters were deprived of potentially handsome profits had the goods arrived in a
sound state. Likewise, bad experiences with seawater damage discouraged
many British manufacturers from exporting to the Southern Cone altogether,
as the examples given above have shown.
From the early 1830s, British textile exporters increasingly used tarpau-
lin, a packing material far superior to ordinary canvas or oilcloth. The
experience of a dominant merchant such as Huth & Co. is illustrative of
91 GHR/5/1/2, Green & Hodgson to Lupton & Co. (Leeds). Buenos Aires, February 28, 1824.
92 WLP, vol. 4, Luccock to Luptons & Luccock (Leeds). Rio de Janeiro, May 25, 1809.
93 GHR/5/1/2. Green & Hodgson to Fielden Brothers (Manchester). Buenos Aires, June 26,
1824. See also GHR/5/1/1, Hodgson to Rawdon. Buenos Aires, April 12, 1820.
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this phenomenon. With the evidence provided in this paper, it is clear that,
thanks to the use of tarpaulin, British exporters who followed Huth’s path
avoided water damage at reasonable costs. This development, ceteris paribus,
greatly promoted British textile exports to the Southern Cone.
The central point of my argument is that better packing promoted exports
not because it was cheaper but because it was waterproof. This is not about
cost reductions, but about a new British technology introduced to protect
textile bales from the inclemency of seawater. Indeed, following this inno-
vation, many underwriters refused to insure against «particular averages» if
goods were not packed in tarpaulin. Furthermore, the use of tarpaulin
reduced considerably the associated marine insurance charges, a further
positive development fostering British exports to Latin America during the
first half of the 19th century. Figure 5 shows clearly the substantial decline in
the cost of marine insurances for Huth’s textile exports to Valparaiso.
I have based many of my conclusions on most of the extant evidence of
British merchant houses trading with the Southern Cone (Huth & Co. in par-
ticular), since they are most fully documented. As Jones notes, the main diffi-
culty in our study on trading companies lies in the fact that «the historical
records of most firms have disappeared» (Jones 2000, p. 14). Yet Huth & Co. was
no ordinary exporter. Rather, it was the main exporter of textiles to Chile during
my period of study. Furthermore, Huth & Co. was also very active in the marine
insurance market, unlike other shippers. Huth insured not only textiles from
Britain to Chile, but also other diverse cargoes from almost anywhere in the
world to any destination94. Its experience, therefore, provides a unique source
with which to assess the importance of packing in tarpaulin and the links with
the marine insurance market (Figure 5). I am not aware of any other mercantile
house trading with the Southern Cone that was so active in the marine insur-
ance market during the 1830s-1840s. If anyone knew about the links between
packing and marine insurance, it was Frederick Huth of London. Huth’s strat-
egy was surely adopted by many other exporters to Chile and Argentina.
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